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Applying Gaussian quantum discord to quantum key distribution
Xiaolong Su∗
State Key Laboratory of Quantum Optics and Quantum Optics Devices,
Institute of Opto-Electronics, Shanxi University, Taiyuan, 030006, People’s Republic of China
In this paper, we theoretically prove that the Gaussian quantum discord state of optical field can
be used to complete continuous variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD). The calculation
shows that secret key can be distilled with a Gaussian quantum discord state against entangling
cloner attack. Secret key rate is increased with the increasing of quantum discord for CV QKD
with the Gaussian quantum discord state. Although the calculated results point out that secret key
rate using the Gaussian quantum discord state is lower than that using squeezed state and coherent
state at the same energy level, we demonstrate that the Gaussian quantum discord, which only
involving quantum correlation without the existence of entanglement, may provide a new resource
for realizing CV QKD.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Bg, 03.67.Lx, 03.65.Ud, 42.50.Dv
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum correlation, which is measured by quantum
discord [1–3], is a fundamental resource for quantum in-
formation processing tasks. It has been shown that some
quantum computational tasks based on a single qubit
can be carried out by separable (that is, non-entangled)
states that nonetheless carries non-classical correlations
[4–6]. Recently, quantum discord is extended to two-
mode Gaussian states [7, 8]. A two-mode Gaussian state
is entangled with Gaussian quantum discord D > 1,
when 0 ≤ D ≤ 1 we have either separable or entangled
states. Gaussian quantum discord has been experimen-
tally demonstrated too [9–11].
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two legiti-
mate parties, Alice and Bob who are linked by a quan-
tum channel and an authenticated classical channel, to
establish the secret key only known by themselves. Con-
tinuous variables (CV) QKD using Gaussian quantum
resource state, such as entangled state, squeezed state
and coherent state, as the resource state, along with rec-
onciliation and privacy amplification procedure to distill
the secret key [12]. There are two type of QKD schemes,
one is called prepare-and-measure scheme, the other is
entanglement-based scheme. The equivalence between
these two type CV QKD schemes has been proved. QKD
with coherent state (squeezed state) has been proved
to be equivalent to heterodyning (homodyning) one of
the two entangled modes of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) entangled state [13]. Generally, the entanglement-
based QKD model is used to investigate the security of
CV QKD. The security of CV QKD scheme has been
analyzed [14–16], and it has been proved to be uncondi-
tionally secure, that is, secure against arbitrary attacks
over long distance [17, 18]. Recently, a CV QKD scheme
with thermal states is also proposed and proved to be
secure against collective Gaussian attacks [19].
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Very recently, it has been shown that quantum discord
can be used as a resource for QKD in general [20]. What
we concerned is the role of Gaussian quantum discord in
CV QKD. In this paper, we apply a two-mode Gaussian
discord state, where only quantum correlation exists and
without entanglement, to implement CV QKD. The cal-
culation shows that the secret key can be distilled with
the two-mode Gaussian discord state against entangling
cloner attack, which is the most important and practi-
cal example of collective Gaussian attack. The secret
key rate of the QKD scheme with Gaussian discord state
is increased with the increasing of the quantum discord.
The secret key rates of the CV QKD schemes with the
Gaussian discord state, squeezed state and coherent state
(no-switching QKD) are compared. Although squeezed
state and coherent state offer higher secret key rate than
the Gaussian discord state, we demonstrate the Gaussian
discord can be used to establish secret key.
II. THE GAUSSIAN DISCORD STATE AND
QKD SCHEME
The QKD scheme with a two-mode Gaussian quan-
tum discord state and entangled state is shown in Fig.
1. Figure 1(a) shows a two-mode Gaussian discord state,
as shown in [9], which is prepared by correlated (anti-
correlated) displacement of two coherent states in the
amplitude (phase) quadrature with a discording noise
V . Figure 1(b) shows an EPR entangled state with a
variance VE = cosh 2r, where r ∈ [0,∞) is the squeez-
ing parameter. The amplitude and phase quadratures
of an optical mode aˆ are defined as Xˆa = aˆ + aˆ
† and
Yˆa = (aˆ− aˆ†)/i, respectively. The variances of amplitude
and phase quadratures for a vacuum (coherent) state are
V (Xˆv) = V (Yˆv) = 1. The covariance matrix of the two-
mode Gaussian quantum resource state in Fig. 1(a) and
(b) is given by
σ =
(
αI γZ
γZ βI
)
, (1)
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FIG. 1: Schematic of the CV QKD scheme with a two-mode
Gaussian state. (a): The two-mode Gaussian discord state,
AM: amplitude modulator, PM: phase modulator, pi: pi phase
shift. (b): EPR entangled state, (c): the CV QKD scheme.
The transmission efficiency of quantum channel is modeled by
a beam splitter with transmission T. Eve performs entangling
cloner attack, where the variance of the ancillary EPR state
is W. Hom: homodyne detection, Het: heterodyne detection.
where I and Z are the Pauli matrices
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, (2)
α = β = VD = V + 1, γ = V for the two-mode Gaussian
discord state and α = β = VE , γ =
√
V 2E − 1 for the
EPR entangled state, respectively.
Quantum discord is defined as the difference between
two quantum analogues of classically equivalent expres-
sion of the mutual information. The Gaussian quantum
discord of a two-mode Gaussian state is given by [8]
DAB = f(
√
I2)− f(ν−)− f(ν+) + f(
√
Emin), (3)
where f(x) = (x+12 ) log
x+1
2 − (x−12 ) log x−12 ,
ν± =
√
∆±√∆2 − 4 detσ
2
(4)
are the symplectic eigenvalues of a two-mode covariance
matrix σ =
(
A C
C B
)
with detσ as the determinant of
covariance matrix and ∆ = detA+ detB+ 2detC, and
Emin =


2I2
3
+(I2−1)(I4−I1)+2|I3|
√
I2
3
+(I2−1)(I4−I1)
(I2−1)2
a)
I1I2−I
2
3
+I4−
√
I4
3
+(I4−I1I2)2−2I23 (I4+I1I2)
2I2
b)
(5)
where a) applies if (I4−I1I2)2 ≤ I23 (I2+1)(I1+I4) and
b) applies otherwise. I1 = detA, I2 = detB, I3 = detC,
I4 = det σ are the symplectic invariants.
PPT criterion is a necessary and sufficient criterion
for entanglement of Gaussian state [21, 22]. A Gaus-
sian state is entangled iff ν˜− < 1, where ν˜− is the small-
est symplectic eigenvalue of partial transposed covariance
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FIG. 2: Quantum discord (a) and smallest symplectic eigen-
value of PPT criterion (b) for the Gaussian discord state.
matrix for two-mode Gaussian state, which is given by
[23]
ν˜− =
√
∆˜−
√
∆˜2 − 4 detσ
2
(6)
where ∆˜ = detA+ detB− 2 detC.
Based on the covariance matrix in eq. (1) for the Gaus-
sian discord state, we calculated the quantum discord and
smallest symplectic eigenvalue of PPT criterion, which
are shown in Fig. 2. As shown in Fig. 2(a), the quantum
discord is increased dramatically with the increasing of
input variance VD in the region of VD ∈ [1, 100]. When
VD > 100, the quantum discord increased slowly with the
increasing of VD. The smallest quantum discord is 0.12
at VD = 1. The quantum discord is always smaller than
1. In Fig. 2(b), the smallest symplectic eigenvalue of
partial transposed covariance matrix is always 1, which
means that there is no entanglement in the Gaussian dis-
cord state.
Figure 1(c) shows the CV QKD scheme with a two-
mode Gaussian state as quantum resource state, which
can be the two-mode Gaussian discord state or the EPR
entangled state. Alice hold mode aˆ, and transmitted
mode bˆ to Bob over the quantum channel. Here, we con-
sider that Alice and Bob perform homodyne (Hom) or
heterodyne (Het) detection on their own beam, which
corresponds to the CV QKD scheme with homodyne or
heterodyne detection. We assume that Eve perform en-
tangling cloner attack [13], which is the most important
and practical example of a collective Gaussian attack
[17, 24–26], to steal the information. She prepares an
ancillary EPR entangled states with variance W , which
corresponds to the excess noise δ = W − 1 in [27] and
ǫ = (W − 1)(1 − T )/T in [13]. W = 1 means there is no
excess noise (δ = 0) in the channel, when W > 1, there
is excess noise (δ = W −1) in the channel. She keeps one
mode Eˆ′′ and mixed the other mode Eˆ with the transmit-
ted mode bˆ in the quantum channel by a beam splitter,
leading to the output mode Eˆ′. Eve’s output modes are
stored in a quantum memory and detected collectively at
the end of the protocol. Eve’s final measurement is opti-
3mized based on Alice and Bob’s classical communication.
After communication is completed, Alice and Bob per-
form reconciliation, error correction [28, 29] and privacy
amplification [30] to distill final secret key.
III. SECURITY OF THE CV QKD SCHEME
A. Homodyne detection
In the CV QKD scheme with homodyne detection, Al-
ice and Bob perform homodyne detection on their own
beams to measure the amplitude or phase quadrature,
respectively. For CV QKD with EPR entangled state,
homodyning one of the entangled beam is equivalent to
the CV QKD with squeezed state. So we will compare the
Gaussian discord state QKD with squeezed state QKD
in this section. In the following, we use the variable X
to represent amplitude or phase quadrature of an opti-
cal mode to analyze the secret key without losing the
generality.
Direct reconciliation. In direct reconciliation, Bob at-
tempts to guess what Alice sent. The secret key rate is
given by
KDR = I(XA : XB)− I(XA : E), (7)
where
I(XA : XB) = H(XB)−H(XB|XA), (8)
is the mutual information between Alice and Bob,
with H(XB) = (1/2) log2 V (XB) and H(XB|XA) =
(1/2) log2 V (XB|XA) being the total and conditional
Shannon entropies. Eve’s information is
I(XA : E) = S(E)− S(E|XA), (9)
where S(·) is the von Neumann entropy. The von Neu-
mann entropy of a Gaussian state ρ can be expressed in
terms of its symplectic eigenvalues [31]
S(ρ) =
n∑
k=1
g(νk), (10)
with g(ν) = 12 (ν + 1) log2[
1
2 (ν + 1)] − 12 (ν − 1)
log2[
1
2 (ν − 1)], where ν = {ν1, ...νn} are the symplectic
eigenvalues of Gaussian state ρ. The symplectic spec-
trum ν = {ν1, ...νn} of an arbitrary correlation matrix σ
can be calculated by finding the (standard) eigenvalues
of the matrix |iΩσ|, where Ω defines the symplectic form
and is given by [12]
Ω =
n⊕
k=1
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (11)
Here
⊕
is the direct sum indicating adding matrices on
the block diagonal.
In Fig. 1(c), the covariance matrix of the two-mode
Gaussian state distributed between Alice and Bob in the
CV QKD is given by
σAB =
(
VAI γ
′
Z
γ′Z VBI
)
, (12)
where VA = VE , VB = TVE+(1−T )W , γ′ =
√
T (V 2E − 1)
for the EPR entangled state and VA = VD, VB = TVD +
(1 − T )W , γ′ = √TV for the Gaussian discord state,
respectively.
The conditional variance is defined as [32] VX|Y =
V (X) − |〈XY 〉|2 /V (Y ). So Bob’s conditional variance
in homodyne detection is given by
VB|A = VB −
γ′2
VA
. (13)
The mutual information between Alice and Bob is
IHom(XA : XB) =
1
2 log2[VB/VB|A], which is same for
the direct and reverse reconciliation.
Eve’s covariance matrix is made up from the modes Eˆ′
and Eˆ′′, which is
σE =
(
evI ϕZ
ϕZ W I
)
, (14)
where ev = (1− T )VA + TW , ϕ =
√
T (W 2 − 1).
In order to obtain S(E|XA) we need to calculate the
symplectic spectrum of the conditional covariance matrix
σE|XA , which represents the covariance matrix of Eve’s
system where mode aˆ has been measured by Alice using
homodyne detection and is given by [12, 33, 34]
σE|XA = σE − (VA)−1DΠDT , (15)
where
Π =
(
1 0
0 0
)
, (16)
and D is the matrix describing the quantum correlations
between Eve’ modes and Alice’s mode, which is given by
D =
( 〈XE´XA〉 I
〈XE′′XA〉Z
)
=
(
ζI
ηZ
)
, (17)
where ζ =
√
1− TVA, η = 0.
Reverse reconciliation. The 3 dB loss limit on the
transmission line in the CV QKD [35] can be beaten with
the reverse reconciliation [36, 37] or the post-selection
[38]. In reverse reconciliation, Alice attempts to guess
what was received by Bob rather than Bob guessing what
was sent by Alice [36]. Such a reverse reconciliation pro-
tocol gives Alice an advantage over a potential eavesdrop-
per Eve. In reverse reconciliation, the secret key rate is
KRR = I(XA : XB)− I(XB : E), (18)
where the mutual information between Alice and Bob
I(XA : XB) is same with what obtained above.
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FIG. 3: Secret key rates for the CV QKD schemes with homo-
dyne detection. (a): the direct reconciliation, (b): the reverse
reconciliation. Solid (black) and Dashed (blue) lines are the
secret key rates for the Gaussian discord state with variance
VD = 40 and 1000, respectively. Dotted (red) line is the se-
cret key rate for the entangled state with VE=40. All curves
are plotted with excess noise W=1.
Eve’s information is given by
I(XB : E) = S(E)− S(E|XB). (19)
The conditional covariance matrix σE|XB , which rep-
resents the covariance matrix of a system where one of
the modes has been measured by homodyne detection (in
this case Bob), is given by [12, 33, 34]
σE|XB = σE − (VB)−1DΠDT . (20)
HereD is the matrix describing the quantum correlations
between Eve’ modes and Bob’s mode, which is given by
D =
( 〈XE´XB〉 I
〈XE′′XB〉Z
)
=
(
ζ′I
η′Z
)
, (21)
where ζ′ =
√
T (1− T )(W − VA), η′ =√
(1− T )(W 2 − 1).
Figure 3 shows the secret key rate of the CV QKD
scheme with homodyne detection, (a) and (b) are cor-
responding to the direct and reverse reconciliation, re-
spectively. Solid (black) and Dashed (blue) lines are the
secret key rates for the Gaussian discord state with vari-
ance VD=40 (typical experimental realistic modulation
level [36]) and 1000, respectively. Dotted (red) line is
the secret key rate for the squeezed state with variance
VE=40. All curves are plotted with excess noise W=1.
Comparing the solid and dotted lines in Fig. 3, it is ob-
vious that secret key rate for squeezed state is greater
than that for Gaussian discord state at the same energy
level in both direct and reverse reconciliation. Compar-
ing solid and dashed lines, we find that the secret key
rate is increased with the increasing of the discording
noise for the CV QKD with the Gaussian discord state
with homodyne detection in both direct and reverse rec-
onciliation.
B. Heterodyne detection
In the CV QKD scheme with heterodyne detection, Al-
ice and Bob perform heterodyne detection to measure the
amplitude and phase quadratures of their own beams si-
multaneously. Since heterodyning one of EPR entangled
state is equivalent to QKD with coherent state. In this
section, we will compare the Gaussian discord state QKD
with no-switching coherent state QKD [39].
In heterodyne detection system, a vacuum mode νˆ is
mixed with the optical mode aˆ (bˆ) on a balanced beam-
splitter and the output modes are measured by two ho-
modyne detectors respectively. The amplitude quadra-
ture measured by Alice and Bob are XˆMA = (Xˆa+Xˆν)/
√
2
and XˆMB = (XˆB + Xˆν)/
√
2, respectively. The corre-
sponding noise variance measured by Alice and Bob are
VMA = (VA + 1)/2 and V
M
B = (VB + 1)/2, respectively.
Bob’s conditional variance is given by VBM |AM =
(VB|AM + 1)/2, where
VB|AM = VB −
γ′2/2
VMA
. (22)
The mutual information between Alice and Bob are
IHet(XA : XB) = log2[VBM /VBM |AM ], which is same for
the direct and reverse reconciliation.
Direct reconciliation. In order to obtain S(E|XB) we
need to calculate the symplectic spectrum of the condi-
tional covariance matrix σ
E|XˆA,YˆA
, which represents the
covariance matrix of a system where two modes has been
measured by heterodyne detection (in this case Alice), is
given by [12, 33, 34]
σ
E|XˆA,YˆA
= σE − (Λ)−1D(ΩσAΩT + I)DT , (23)
where Λ = detσA+TrσA + 1, ΩσAΩ
T + I = σA + I, and
D is given by eq. (18).
Reverse reconciliation. The correlation matrix
σE|XˆB ,YˆB , which represents the covariance matrix of a
system where two modes has been measured by hetero-
dyne detection (in this case Bob), is given by [12, 33, 34]
σ
E|XˆB ,YˆB
= σE − (Λ′)−1D(ΩσBΩT + I)DT , (24)
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FIG. 4: Secret key rates for the CV QKD schemes with het-
erodyne detection. (a): the direct reconciliation, (b): the
reverse reconciliation. Solid (black) and Dashed (blue) lines
are the secret key rates for the Gaussian discord state with
VD=40 and 1000, respectively. Dotted (red) line is the secret
key rate for the entangled state with VE=40. All curves are
plotted with excess noise W=1.
where Λ′ = detσB+TrσB +1, ΩσBΩ
T + I = σB + I, and
the matrix D is same with eq. (22), which describing
the quantum correlations between Eve’ modes and Bob’s
mode.
Figure 4 shows the secret key rates for the CV QKD
schemes with heterodyne detection, (a) and (b) are for
the direct and reverse reconciliation, respectively. Solid
(black) and Dashed (blue) lines are the secret key rates
for the Gaussian discord state with VD = 40 and 1000,
respectively. Dotted (red) line is the secret key rate for
the entangled state with VE = 40. All curves are plotted
with excess noise W = 1. In Fig. 4(a), comparing solid
and dotted lines, we find that secret key can be distilled
for the Gaussian discord state at lower transmission effi-
ciency than that for coherent state with heterodyne de-
tection. When T > 0.78, secret key rate for coherent
state is still higher than that for the Gaussian discord
state with heterodyne detection. In Fig. 4(b), compar-
ing solid and dotted lines, it is obvious that no-switching
coherent state QKD offers higher secret key rate and
longer transmission distance than that the Gaussian dis-
cord state QKD. We also noticed that no secret key can
be distilled for the Gaussian discord state at lower trans-
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FIG. 5: The dependence of secret key rates on quantum dis-
cord for the CV QKD schemes with the Gaussian discord
state. (a) and (b): the direct and reverse reconciliation for
homodyne detection, respectively. (c) and (d): the direct and
reverse reconciliation for heterodyne detection, respectively.
Solid (black), Dashed (red) and Dotted (blue) lines are the
secret key rates for the Gaussian discord state with transmis-
sion efficiency of 0.75, 0.8 and 0.9, respectively. Dash-dotted
(green) line in (b) is the secret key rate for the Gaussian dis-
cord state with transmission efficiency of 0.3. All curves are
plotted with excess noise W=1, VD ∈ [1, 1000].
mission efficiency (T < 0.55) with reverse reconciliation,
which is different from coherent state QKD. Comparing
solid and dashed lines in Fig. 4(a) and (b), respectively,
we find that secret key rate is increased with increasing
of the discording noise for both direct and reverse recon-
ciliation in CV QKD with the Gaussian quantum discord
state, which is same with the result of homodyne detec-
tion.
IV. DEPENDENCE OF SECRET KEY RATE ON
QUANTUM DISCORD
As shown in Fig. 5, the dependence of secret key rate
for the Gaussian discord state on quantum discord are
investigated at different transmission efficiency with in-
put variance VD ∈ [1, 1000]. Fig. 5(a) and (b) are the
case of direct and reverse reconciliation for homodyne
detection, respectively. Fig. 5(c) and (d) are the case
of direct and reverse reconciliation for heterodyne detec-
tion, respectively. It is obvious that secret key rate is
monotonically increased with the increasing of quantum
discord. Solid (black), Dashed (red) and Dotted (blue)
lines are the secret key rates for the Gaussian discord
state with transmission efficiency of 0.75, 0.8 and 0.9,
respectively. Dash-dotted (green) line in Fig. 5(b) is
the secret key rate for the Gaussian discord state with
transmission efficiency of 0.3, which means that secret
key can be distilled when T < 0.5 in reverse reconcilia-
tion for homodyne detection. Comparing these traces, we
find that secret key rate is increased with the increasing
of transmission efficiency, which is same with the result
6in Fig. 3 and 4. Most of the secret key rates start from
DAB = 0.12, since 0.12 is the smallest quantum discord
with VD = 1 as shown in Fig. 2(a). When T = 0.75
(solid line) in Fig. 5(c), secret key can be distilled when
DAB > 0.22.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, by considering CV QKD with a two-
mode Gaussian discord state, which has only quantum
correlation and without entanglement, we show that se-
cret key can be distilled against entangling cloner attack.
In CV QKD with the Gaussian discord state,the secret
key rate is increased with increasing of quantum discord
in both homodyne and heterodyne detection schemes
with direct and reverse reconciliation. By comparing the
secret key rates of CV QKD schemes with the Gaussian
discord state, squeezed state and coherent state, we find
that squeezed state and coherent state offer higher secret
key rate than the Gaussian discord state at the same en-
ergy level for both direct and reverse reconciliation. This
is a natural result since Gaussian discord of the Gaussian
discord state (0 ≤ D ≤ 1) is smaller than that of EPR
entangled state (D > 1). This work provides a possible
application of Gaussian quantum discord.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks for helpful discussion with Prof.
Changde Xie, Kunchi Peng, Jing Zhang and Xiaojun Jia.
This research was supported by the National Basic Re-
search Program of China (Grant No. 2010CB923103),
NSFC (Grant Nos. 11174188, 61121064), Shanxi Schol-
arship Council of China (Grant No. 2012-010) and OIT.
[1] H. Ollivier and W. H. Zurek, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 017901
(2001).
[2] K. Modi, A. Brodutch, H. Cable, T. Paterek and V. Ve-
dral, Rev. Mod. Phys. 84, 1655 (2012).
[3] B. Aaronson, R. Lo Franco, G. Compagno and G. Adesso,
New J. Phys. 18, 093022 (2013).
[4] E. Knill and R. Laflamme, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 5672–
5675 (1998).
[5] C. A. Ryan, J. Emerson, D. Poulin, C. Negrevergne, and
R. Laflamme, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 250502 (2005).
[6] B. P. Lanyon, M. Barbieri, M. P. Almeida, and A. G.
White, Phys. Rev. Lett. 101, 200501 (2008).
[7] P. Giorda and M. G. A. Paris, Phys. Rev. Lett. 105,
020503 (2010).
[8] G. Adesso and A. Datta, Phys. Rev. Lett. 105, 030501
(2010).
[9] M. Gu, et al. Nat. Phys. 8, 671–675 (2012).
[10] R. Blandino, et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 180402 (2012).
[11] L. S. Madsen, A. Berni, M. Lassen, and U. L. Andersen,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 030402 (2012).
[12] C. Weedbrook, et al. Rev. Mod. Phys. 84, 621–669
(2012).
[13] F. Grosshans, N. J. Cerf, J. Wenger, R. Tualle-Brouri,
and Ph. Grangier, Quantum. Inf. Comput. 3, 535–552
(2003).
[14] S. Iblisdir, G. Van Assche, and N. J. Cerf, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 93, 170502 (2004).
[15] F. Grosshans, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 020504 (2005).
[16] M. Navascue´s, and A. Ac´ın, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 020505
(2005).
[17] R. Renner and J. I. Cirac, Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 110504
(2009).
[18] A. Leverrier and P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 102,
180504 (2009).
[19] C. Weedbrook, S. Pirandola, and T. C. Ralph, Phys. Rev.
A 86, 022318 (2012).
[20] S. Pirandola, arxiv:quant-ph/1309.2446.
[21] R. Simon, Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 2726–2729 (2000).
[22] R. F. Werner and M. M. Wolf, Phys. Rev. Lett. 86, 3658
(2001).
[23] A. Serafini, F. Illuminati, and S. De Siena, J. Phys. B: At.
Mol. Opt. Phys. 37, L21 (2004); G. Adesso, A. Serafini,
and F. Illuminati, Phys. Rev. A 70, 022318 (2004).
[24] M. Navascue´s, F. Grosshans, and A. Ac´ın, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 97, 190502 (2006).
[25] R. Garc´ıa-Patro´n and N. J. Cerf, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97,
190503 (2006).
[26] S. Pirandola, S. L. Braunstein, and S. Lloyd, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 101, 200504 (2008).
[27] R. Namiki and T. Hirano, Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 117901
(2004).
[28] G. Brassard and L. Salavail, Advances in Cryptology-
Eurocrypt’93 Lecture Notes in Computer Science, T.
Helleseth, ed. (Springer, New York, 1993) 410-423.
[29] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Cre´peau, and U. M. Mau-
rer, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 41, 1915-1923 (1995).
[30] C. Cachin and U. M. Maurer, J. Cryptology 10, 97-110
(1997).
[31] A. S. Holevo, M. Sohma, and O. Hirota, Phys. Rev. A
59, 1820–1828 (1999).
[32] P. Grangier, J. A. Levenson, and J. -P. Poizat, Nature
396, 537–542 (1998).
[33] J. Eisert, S. Scheel, and M. B. Plenio, Phys. Rev. Lett.
89, 137903 (2002).
[34] J. Fiura`sˇek, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 137904 (2002).
[35] F. Grosshans and P. Grangier, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88,
057902 (2002).
[36] F. Grosshans, et al. Nature 421, 238–241 (2003).
[37] Z. Lu, et al. Science China Physics, Mechanics & Astron-
omy, 53, 100-105 (2010)
[38] Ch. Silberhorn, T. C. Ralph, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and G.
Leuchs, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 167901 (2002).
[39] C. Weedbrook, et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 170504, (2004).
